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B.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court decided Matal v. Tam in the summer of 2017,
officially striking down a provision of the Lanham Act that had been a staple
of trademark law for the past century.'
The decision elicited mixed
responses. 2 On one side, the case was a victory for the First Amendment
combating government censorship of a band's attempt to reclaim a racial
slur.3 On the other side, the case legitimized the registration of racially

1. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1768 (2017) (holding the government
impermissibly denied registration to the "Slants").
2. See Ben Natter et al., USPTO Navigates New Territory in The Wake of Matal v.
Tam, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/08/17/usptonavigates-matal-v-tam/id= 86961 (noting the controversy surrounding the Supreme
Court's decision).
3. See Lisa Ramsey, Symposium: Increasing First Amendment scrutiny of
trademarklaw after Matal v. Tam, SCOTUsBLOG (Jun. 20, 2017, 2:33 PM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium-increasing-first-amendment-scrutiny-trademarklaw-matal-v-tam (explaining courts often avoid the constitutional analysis in trademark
disputes).
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charged trademarks such as "the Redskins.",4 Despite the often controversial
outcomes of First Amendment case law, protection of free speech is central
to the liberty at the heart of the United States' legal system.5
Now, uncertainty abounds as to whether the government is impermissibly
censoring speech in other provisions of the Lanham Act. 6 Specifically,
dilution by tarnishment, a niche area of trademark law, may not withstand a
First Amendment challenge in the wake of the Supreme Court's recent
landmark decision in Matal.'
This comment argues that dilution by tarnishment violates the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.8 Part II describes the source,
elements, legal theory, and scientific evidence concerning dilution by
tarnishment. 9 Part II also explains the interaction between trademark law
and First Amendment free speech protections. 10 Part III identifies three
potential standards for constitutional analysis of dilution by tarnishment. 11
Part III further asserts that dilution by tarnishment does not survive any of
the three potential tests under the First Amendment. 12 Part IV recommends
elimination of dilution by tarnishment and further examination of the
constitutionality of dilution by blurring, the only other form trademark
dilution.' 3 Part V reiterates that dilution by tarnishment restricts protected

4. See JusticeDepartment drops Redskins name fight, CBS NEWS (Jun. 29, 2017),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-department-drops-fight-over-redskins-name
(implying that circuit courts have a significant role in shaping the interpretation of
trademarks within First Amendment jurisprudence).
5. See generally DAVID S. SCHWARTZ & LORI A. RINGHAND, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK 937 (2013) (charting the development of
the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause).
6. See Natter, supra note 2 (suggesting the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office may
seek alternative methods for rejecting disparaging, scandalous, or offensive marks).
7. See Ramsey, supra note 3 (questioning the future of dilution by tarnishment).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from "abridging the freedom of
speech).
9. See infra Part II (discussing the disconnect between dilution by tarnishment and
its alleged harm).
10. See infra Part II (identifying the tension between trademark law and the First
Amendment).
11. See infra Part III (asserting that dilution by tarnishment targets viewpoint,
expressive speech, or, in the alternative, commercial speech).
12. See infra Part III (arguing dilution by tarnishment constitutes viewpoint
discrimination, fails the strict scrutiny expressive speech test, or fails the intermediate
scrutiny commercial speech test).
13. See infra Part IV (suggesting the government proactively address the
constitutional problems of dilution by tarnishment).
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speech and should be struck down as an impermissible violation of the free
speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment. 14
I.
A.
1.

BACKGROUND

Dilution by Tarnishment

Source ofLaw

Dilution became an actionable legal theory in the early 20 th century, yet
Congress did not codify dilution until passing the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995 [FTDA].' 5 The FTDA did not explicitly include
dilution by tamishment, so the federal circuits did not uniformly allow
dilution by tamishment claims.16 With the Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2006 [TDRA], Congress clarified the existence of tarnishment claims,
defining dilution by tamishment as the "association arising from the
similarity between a mark or a trade name and a famous mark that harms the
17
reputation of the famous mark.'
2.

Elements

The TDRA sets forth four basic elements necessary for a prima facie
dilution by tamishment claim.' 8 First, the plaintiff's mark must be famous,
which is a relatively high bar. 19 For example, Adidas's "three stripe" mark
is famous while "Coach" failed the fame inquiry because the TDRA does not

14. See infra Part V (calling for the invalidation of dilution by tamishment).
15. See Frank Schechter, The RationalBasis of Trademark Protection,40 HARV. L.
REv. 813, 831 (1927) (arguing for the protection of a trademark's uniqueness against
unauthorized uses of a mark on unrelated products); Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98 § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127),
superseded by the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (protecting famous marks
from attacks to the distinctiveness or reputation of the mark, regardless of confusion);
see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the authority to regulate
commerce).
16. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, supra note 15 (identifying only
dilution by blurring); Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003)
(questioning the existence of dilution by tamishment).
17. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 43, 120
Stat. 1730, 1731 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (allowing
injunctions against defendants using dilutive marks).
18. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 43, 120
Stat. 1730, need pincite (2006) (reducing the number of factors from eight).
19. See id. (defining fame as "widely recognized by the general consuming public of
the United States as a designation of source... ").
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allow "niche" fame.20 Second, the defendant must use the plaintiffs mark
in commerce. 2' Third, the defendant's first use of the mark must have
occurred after the plaintiff's mark achieves fame. Fourth, the defendant's
use of its lesser known mark will likely cause dilution of the plaintiffs
famous mark.' 3
Courts find a likelihood of dilution by tarnishment when a defendant's use
of its lesser known mark associates a famous mark with "unwholesome" or
"shoddy" products.24 For instance, the Ninth Circuit in V Secret Catalogue,
Inc. noted that an "unwholesome" association generally means the
association relates to sex or drugs.25
3.

Theories ofHarm

The original theory of dilution's harm was the gradual whittling away
of a mark's distinctiveness.26 Dilution by tarnishment departs from this
objective by focusing instead on harm to the reputation of a famous mark.2
20. Compare Adidas Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1029,
1062-63 (D. Or. 2008) (finding Adidas's "three stripe" mark fulfilled the famous mark
requirement), with Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning, LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1357,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding Coach did not establish fame because Coach's fame was
"niche", and the TDRA eliminated niche fame).
21. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 43, 120
Stat. 1730, 1731(eliminating the "commercial use in commerce" language); see also
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906-907 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that,
while the distribution of records containing the "Barbie Girl" song fulfilled the use in
commerce requirement, MCA's use of the "Barbie" mark was noncommercial).
22. See Jarritos, Inc. v. Los Jarritos, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32245, *1, *54 (N.D.
Cal. May 2, 2007) (finding no evidence of plaintiff s fame prior to defendant's use).
23. Compare Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003) (requiring
actual dilution under the FTDA), with V. Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d
382, 387 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting the TDRA explicitly changed the standard from actual
dilution to likelihood of dilution).
24. See V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 605 F.3d at 387-388 (stating that unwholesome
association is a general category within dilution by tarnishment); Dan-Foam A/S v.
Brand Named Beds, LLC, 500 F. Supp. 2d 296, 324-326 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding a
material quality difference in the lesser known mark's underlying goods that could harm
the famous mark's reputation).
25. See V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 605 F.3d at 388 (establishing a rebuttable
presumption that "lewd or bawdy sexual activity disparages and defiles the famous
mark... "); see also Coca-Cola Co. v. AlmaLeo U.S.A., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 725, 728
(N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding tarnishment for candy powder resembling cocaine in bottles
resembling Coke bottles).
26. See Schechter, supra note 15, at 344 (highlighting the harm to a mark's
distinctiveness as dilution's original priority).
27. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 435 120
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Congress did not explain the nature of this harm
or how this harm occurs,
28
and no clear consensus exists among the courts.

One theory posits that the defendant's use of a lesser known mark that is
similar to a famous mark activates neurological pathways between the two
marks in the mind of consumers.2 9 Under this cognitive model theory, the
negative connotation of the defendant's mark relative to the famous mark
persists through the activated neural pathways, degrading the famous mark's
reputation in the mind of the consumer.30 However, courts are not always
receptive to this cognitive model theory.3'
Furthermore, Congress has not clearly identified the victims of dilution by
tarnishment's asserted harm, leaving scholars and practitioners to theorize
about whom those victims might be.32 First, the tarnishing mark may directly
harm the famous mark's owner by creating a negative association in the
consumer's mind.33
The plain meaning of the statute supports this
interpretation.3 4 Second, the tarnishing mark may harm the consumer by
diminishing the value of the famous mark as a source identifier to the
consumer. 35 This interpretation of the harm's victims assumes that

Stat. 1730, 1731 (lacking the focus on distinctiveness that dilution by blurring features).
28. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-23, at 25 (2005) (asserting, without further explanation,
that harm to the famous mark exists); Christine Farley, Why We Are ConfusedAbout the
Trademark Dilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1175, 1177

(2006) (explaining the uncertainty among many courts and trademark experts about the
harms of dilution).
29. See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining the
human mind's "inveterate tendency" to create associations).
30. See id. (noting the harm of persistent negative associations); Rebecca Tushnet,
Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: TrademarkLaw and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REv. 507,
522-523 (2008) (explaining the persistent mental activation necessary for understanding
dilution by tarnishment under the cognitive model).
31. CompareNat'l Football League Props., Inc. v. Prostyle, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 665,
668-673 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (finding general explanations underlying the cognitive theory
inadmissible), with Pfizer, Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(finding that using a "Viva Viagra" slogan at various adult conventions would likely
tarnish the "Viagra" mark).
32. See Brian A. Jacobs, Trademark Dilution on the Constitutional Edge, 104
COLUM. L. REv. 161, 189-90 (2004) (attempting to identify the victims of dilution's
alleged harm).
33. See id. at 190 (noting the potential for reputational harm to affect profitability).
34. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 43, 120
Stat. 1730, 1731 (defining dilution by tarnishment as harm to the famous mark's
reputation).
35. See V. Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2010)
(noting the effect of consumer of taste on the value of famous marks). Cf, Trademark
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consumers value famous trademarks.3 6 The TDRA's legislative history
indicates Congress vacillated between which interpretation fuels dilution by
tamishment.3
Another theory is that dilution by tamishment protects famous marks from
free riding by lesser known marks.3 8 Free riding occurs when the owner of
a lesser known mark creates an association with a more famous mark to
improve the lesser known mark's reputation or reach by exploiting the
famous mark's success.39 Accordingly, the free riding theory of harm posits
dilution by tarnishment is simply an indirect attempt to protect big brands
from free riding, despite any rhetoric otherwise.40
B.

FirstAmendment and TrademarkLaw

The First Amendment prohibits federal regulations from impermissibly
infringing on the right to freedom of speech.4 ' Courts assess Congress's
ability to regulate speech with different levels of scrutiny depending on the
characteristics of the speech and of the regulation.4 2
1.

Commercial vs. Expressive Speech
Commercial speech warrants less constitutional protection than expressive

Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 43, 120 Stat. 1730, 1730 (detailing
dilution by blurring's focus on the diminishment of the famous mark's capacity to serve
as a source identifier).
36. See Jacobs, supra note 32, at 187 (asserting a trademark's value stems from its
ability to decrease the mental effort required to make confident purchasing decisions).
37. Compare H.R. Rep. No. 109-23, at 25 (2005) (detailing the statement of Rep.
Berman in support of dilution by tamishment), with 152 CONG. REC. H6964 (daily ed.
Sept. 25, 2006) (detailing the statement of Rep. Wu against dilution by tamishment).
38. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002)
(distinguishing trademark infringement's protection of a mark's source-identifying
aspects and dilution's protection of a mark owner's substantial investment in the
goodwill of their marks from free riding).
39. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, PUB. No. 725(E),
PROTECTION AGAINST UNFAIR COMPETITION 55 (1994) (defining free riding as the
broadest form of competition by imitation).
40. See generally Lisa P. Ramsey, A Free Speech Right to TrademarkProtection?,
106 TRADEMARK REP. 797 (2016) (advocating for Congress to clearly define the purpose
of prohibiting dilution).
41. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (establishing that free speech restrictions are
unconstitutional).
42. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Dialogue, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT 9 (L.
Bollinger & G. Stone eds., 2001) (noting that speech is generally presumed to have high
societal value).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2019

7

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 6
472

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 27:3

speech.43 Commercial speech usually "does no more than propose a
commercial transaction., 44 Trademarks exist in commerce and identify a
unique source of goods or services. 45
Thus, trademarks encourage
commercial transactions.46 However, trademarks often also have inherent
expressive meaning.4
Federal courts typically look to the trademark's function on a case-by-case
basis, yet the courts disagree on where to draw the line between expressive
and commercial speech. 48
After acknowledging the argument that
trademarks could be expressive speech, the Supreme Court declined to
provide an answer, leaving open the appropriate framework for analyzing
49
First Amendment free speech challenges to the Lanham Act.
2.

PotentialStandards of Review

Regulation based on viewpoint discrimination demands the application of
strict scrutiny constitutional analysis.50 Viewpoint-based regulations are
presumptively
facially
unconstitutional. 5 '
Moreover,
viewpoint

43. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976) (establishing explicitly that the First Amendment protects commercial
speech); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 5 (2000) (comparing commercial speech to other types of expression warranting
greater free speech protection).
44. See, e.g.. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting
that the boundary between commercial and noncommercial speech has not been clearly
delineated).
45. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (establishing the "use in commerce"
requirement for trademark infringement and defining "trademark" and "use in
commerce").
46. See generally J. Thomas McCarthy, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 31:139 (4th ed. 2008) (asserting that trademarks encourage consumers
to enter into commercial transactions by providing product information).
47. See Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 906-07 (finding the use of "Barbie" in the song
"Barbie Girl" expressed criticism of what Barbie represents).
48. See generally Lisa P. Ramsey & Jens Schovsbo, Mechanismsfor Limiting Trade
Mark Rights to Further Competition and Free Speech, 44 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 671, 693-95 (2013) (charting the wide disparity for classification of
trademarks among the federal circuit courts).
49. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (refusing to establish
intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate test for judging the constitutionality of
trademarks under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment).
50. See Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 366 (8th Cir. 1988)
(stating that the government can justify content-based discrimination only when the
"regulation is narrowly drawn and is necessary to effectuate a compelling state interest").
51. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819. 828-29
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52
discrimination analysis applies to both expressive and commercial speech.
Content-based regulation of expressive speech also calls for the
application of strict scrutiny constitutional analysis.5 3 To survive a First
Amendment challenge, the face of the regulation must be the least
restrictive
54
interest.
government
compelling
a
achieve
to
means
possible
When judging the constitutionality of the regulations relating to
commercial speech, courts utilize the intermediate scrutiny test articulated in
Central Hudson.55 The four-part test questions whether the face of the
regulation directly advances a substantial government
interest and is not
56
more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.

3.

Disparagementand Scandalousness Clauses

The Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act allowed the United States
Patent and Trademark Office [USPTO] to deny trademark registration to
marks disparaging persons alive or dead.5 Similarly, the Scandalousness
Clause allowed the USPTO to deny registration to scandalous or offensive
marks.58
In Tam, the Supreme Court struck down the Disparagement Clause
5 9
because it violated the First Amendment's protection of free speech.
(1995) (forbidding the government from suppressing speech out of disapproval for the
ideas that the speech conveys).
52. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011) (explaining that
commercial speech is not an exception to the heightened scrutiny viewpoint
discrimination requires); see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-32 (noting that silencing
all sides of a debate makes a law more viewpoint-based).
53. See Turner Broad. Sys. V. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 624 (1994) (explaining that
content-based regulations require strict scrutiny review because they suppress ideas).
54. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(asserting that a narrowly tailored regulation is the least restrictive means to achieving
the stated interest).
55. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (distinguishing commercial speech intermediate scrutiny from expressive speech
intermediate scrutiny).
56. See id. (questioning "whether (1) the speech concerns lawful activity and is not
misleading; (2) the asserted government interest is substantial; (3) the regulation directly
advances that government interest; and (4) whether the regulation is 'not more extensive
than necessary to serve that interest'); see also Bd. of Tr. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1989) (explaining that the fourth prong does not require the
regulation to be the least restrictive means of achieving the desired interest).
57. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (detailing permissible grounds for
registration refusal).
58. See id. (including immoral marks within the scope of required refusals).
59. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (finding the Disparagement
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Specifically, the Tam Court found that the Disparagement Clause regulated
based on views with which the government did not approve. 60 After Tam,
the Federal Court of Appeals in Brunettiheld that the Scandalousness Clause
61
also violated the First Amendment based on the Tam opinion.
II.

ANALYSIS

A. Dilution by Tarnishment is Facially Unconstitutional Under the Free
Speech Clause of the FirstAmendment Because It DiscriminatesBased on
Viewpoint.
Dilution by tarnishment violates the First Amendment's protection of free
62
speech by suppressing particular views on a subject.
1. Dilution by Tarnishment Targets Viewpoint Because It Suppresses a
Mark's Negative View of a Famous Trademark.
A regulation constitutes viewpoint discrimination when the government
targets not the subject matter but the particular ideas, opinions, or
perspectives of the speaker. 63 Because it regulates based on a perceived
negative opinion of the mark, dilution by tarnishment discriminates based on
viewpoint.64

Viewpoint discrimination is presumptively invalid because it is an
"egregious" form of speech regulation. 65 For example, the Supreme Court
in Rosenberger held that a University's rules denying funds to a student
group based on the group's determination to write with religious perspectives

Clause discriminated based on viewpoint and failed intermediate scrutiny).
60. See id. at 1765-66 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting viewpoint discrimination
alone was sufficient grounds to invalidate the Disparagement Clause).
61. See In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding the
Scandalousness Clause failed either strict or intermediate scrutiny review), cert. granted,
139 S. Ct. 782 (2019).
62. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-32
(1995) (proclaiming that viewpoint discriminatory legislation is presumptively
unconstitutional, regardless of whether the legislation targets one or multiple
viewpoints).
63. See Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 366 (8th Cir. 1988)
(holding that regulating speech from a group advocating for equal rights regardless of
sexual orientation targeted viewpoint).
64. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1766-67 (clarifying that regulating based on "the reaction
of the speaker's audience" does not protect a law from viewpoint discrimination).
65. See Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1349 (noting that the parties did not dispute that the
Scandalousness Clause would fail strict scrutiny if strict scrutiny applied).
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in their journalistic works constituted viewpoint discrimination.66 While the
University did not forbid discussion of religion in general, the University did
reject works written with a religious perspective.6 Prohibiting religious
views violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment because it
skewed the "marketplace of ideas. 68
In the trademark context, the subject of a mark is normally the mental
association the mark evokes in consumers. 69 Because marks consist of
language, the subject of a mark depends on the meaning behind the language
in that mark.70 Because the meaning of the mark's language exists in the
mind of the consumers exposed to the mark, the subject of the mark depends
71
on the mental association the mark evokes in the mind of consumers.
The First Amendment prohibits the government from impermissibly
suppressing marks based on mental associations, the government does not
agree with. 2 For example, the mark "The Slants" consists of the word
"slants," which the dictionary often defines as a slope or leaning position.
Yet, the USPTO determined the mark ultimately evoked a mental association
with the derogation of Asian persons. By denying trademark registration
status based on an allegedly disparaging mental association, the government
utilized the Disparagement Clause to engage in a "happy talk" regime that

66. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (identifying the religious perspective as the
primary reason for the denial of funds despite arguments otherwise).
67. See id. (clarifying that, while religion can be a vast subject, the student group
used religion as a "standpoint from which [they discussed] a variety of subjects").
68. See id. (emphasizing the harm of viewpoint discrimination that targets all sides
of a debate).
69. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (discussing that the purpose of
trademark protection stems from the ability of the mark's words to help distinguish
sources of goods from one another in the mind of the consumer).
70. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (reconciling
language's role in defining a mark and a mark's role in informing language).
71. See id. (respecting the public's role in defining the mental contours of language
and trademarks).
72. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting that the
government cannot shield a law from allegations of viewpoint discriminating by citing
the negative reactions of the speaker's audience).
73. See id. at 1753 (noting that a USPTO examining attorney's first step in
determining whether a mark is disparaging is to consult the dictionary definition of the
mark's words, followed by other considerations such as how people use the mark or its
words in the marketplace).
74. See id. at 1756 (dismissing any contention that the Disparagement Clause was
an anti-discrimination clause).
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discriminated against negative viewpoints.
The TDRA does not break from this basic framework for marks, but the
TDRA alters its application by artificially treating the famous mark as the
subject of the lesser known mark. 6 To satisfy the TDRA requirement of an
association between the two marks for any dilution claim, courts must
examine the content of the lesser known mark relative to that of the famous
mark.
Because the famous mark is the focus of this analysis, the mental
association the famous mark evokes in consumers remains the subject of the
famous mark. 8
Conversely, the TDRA shifts the primary focus of the lesser known mark
to the effect the lesser known mark has on the public's mental association
toward the famous mark.79 The TDRA defines dilution by tarnishment as an
"association arising from the similarity between a [lesser known mark] and
a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark."80 Because the
marks must be sufficiently similar to evoke a mental association while only
the famous mark's reputation warrants legal protection, the TDRA
effectively treats the famous mark as the relevant subject of the lesser known
mark. 8' For example, the Sixth Circuit in Moseley found enough similarity
between "Victor's Secret" and "Victoria's Secret" for Victoria's Secret to
bring a dilution by tamishment claim because a consumer could create a
mental association between the two marks, regardless of any consumer
confusion.8 2 Thus, the TDRA treats the famous mark as the subject of the
defendant's mark.83
75. See id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that viewpoint neutral
legislation protects the speaker's "right to create and present argument for particular
positions in particular ways, as the speaker chooses").
76. See TDRA, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730, 1731 (2006) (focusing on the
harm the lesser known mark causes to the famous mark's reputation).
77. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903-04 (9th Cir.
2002) (noting that the parties did not dispute the marks' similarity).
78. See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2010)
(focusing on the mental association Victoria's Secret evokes in the mind of its
consumers).
79. See id. (declaring further that mere association is not enough to establish an
actionable dilution claim).
80. See TDRA, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730, 1731 (2006) (focusing on the
harm to the famous mark's reputation rather than the activity causing the harm).
81. See Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Comput. Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir.
2004) ("The point of dilution law is to protect the owner's investment in his mark").
82. See V Secret Catalogue, 605 F.3d at 389 (assuming no consumer confusion
existed between the two marks).
83. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894. 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (going
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Furthermore, dilution by tarnishment suppresses speech based on
viewpoint by silencing lesser known marks that likely offer a negative
perspective on the famous mark.8 4 While the TDRA redirects the analytical
focus of the lesser known mark, the lesser known mark retains its own,
original mental association in the mind of its consumers.8" Accordingly,
Victor's Secret continued to evoke a mental association with sexual material;
the court merely conducted its legal analysis as if Victoria's Secret
was the
86
subject of the Victor's Secret mark, as the TDRA commanded.
Although it is not the subject of the defendant's mark in a dilution claim,
the mental association that the defendant's mark elicits determines the
viewpoint that the defendant's mark takes in a dilution by tarnishment
claim.8 7 Because dilution by tarnishment prohibits associations harming the
reputation of the famous mark, courts look to whether the defendant's mark
evokes a negative mental association that would likely harm the mental
association inspired by the famous mark.88 The specific viewpoint depends
on the nature of the mark, yet the obligation for courts to look for a negative
mental association means that dilution by tarnishment necessarily regulates
based on viewpoint.8 9 Accordingly, in V. Secret Catalogue,Inc., the Sixth
through the content-based similarity analysis, even when the lesser known mark and the
famous mark are identical).
84. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1767 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(proposing that a law mandating positivity silences dissent and distorts the marketplace
of ideas).
85. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(identifying the mental association that "Viva Viagra" evokes from use at various adult
conventions before examining the effect of that mental association on the reputation of
the famous mark "Viagra").
86. See V Secret Catalogue, 605 F.3d at 388 (acknowledging that Victor's Secrets
evokes a particular mental association from consumers for its sale of sex-related
products, but focusing on that mental association's effect on Victoria's Secret to
determine legal liability).
87. Compare id. (perceiving a sex-related, negative mental association), with CocaCola Co. v. AlmaLeo U.S.A., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 725, 728 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (perceiving a
drug-related, negative mental association).
88. See V Secret Catalogue, 605 F.3d at 389 (holding that a lesser known mark's
sex-related association creates a rebuttable presumption for a likelihood of tarnishment
of the famous mark).
89. See id. at 389 (establishing that "any new mark with a lewd or offensive-to-some
sexual association raises a strong inference of tarnishment"); see also Dan-Foam A/S v.
Brand Named Beds, LLC, 500 F. Supp. 2d 296, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (remanding
because a material question of fact remained as to whether a jury could form negative
opinions of the famous mark after interacting with the lesser known mark and its lower
quality products).
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Circuit silenced the lesser known mark "Victor's Secret" because the court
thought the mark's sexually charged association evoked a negative
association that could likely tarnish the reputation of Victoria's Secret.9"
While Congress's recorded discussions of dilution by tarnishment are
sparse, the TDRA's legislative history supports the viewpoint-targeted
characteristic of dilution by tarnishment. 91 For example, Mr. Conyers
explicitly listed a "disparaging usage of a same or similar mark by others" as
an example explaining the merits of dilution by tarnishment. 92 The explicit
likening of dilution by tarnishment to disparagement, especially in the
absence of other clear congressional motivations otherwise, indicates
Congress likely intended to regulate based on viewpoint. 93
Dilution by tarnishment targets viewpoint for government regulation by
94
suppressing a mark's unwholesome viewpoint toward a famous trademark.
Therefore, dilution by tarnishment must survive strict scrutiny review to be
95
constitutional under the First Amendment.

2. Dilution by TarnishmentDoes Not Survive Strict Scrutiny Review
Because the Government Does Not Have a Compelling Interest in
Regulating TarnishingSpeech.
The Government must demonstrate a compelling interest behind a
regulation that discriminates based on viewpoint for that regulation to
survive strict scrutiny review.96
90. See VSecret Catalogue, 605 F.3d at 389 (discounting the importance of the fact
that the owner of "Victor's Secret" shared the name Victor).
91. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-23, at 4 (2005) ("The purpose of the FTDA is to protect
famous trademarks [... ] from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark
or tarnish or disparageit, even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion") (emphasis
added).
92. See 152 CONG. REC. H6964 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2006) (arguing additionally for
a likelihood of harm standard).
93. See VSecret Catalogue, 605 F.3d at 389 (emphasizing that Congress's revision
of the TDRA in direct response to Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003)
indicated Congress intended Victor's Secret to fall under dilution by tarnishment's scope
of speech-suppressing liability).
94. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1762 (2017) (reiterating the severity of
government discrimination against offensive speech).
95. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831-32
(1995) (maintaining that the government's impermissible suppression of even one
perspective within a subject constitutes viewpoint discrimination).
96. See, e.g., Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361. 366 (8th Cir.
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In general, the government has a compelling interest in promoting the
orderly flow of commerce. 97 However, the government does not have a
compelling interest in regulating offensive speech because the First
Amendment protects offensive speech. 98 In Tam, the Supreme Court found
that the government does not have a compelling interest for regulating
disparaging speech. 99 Similarly, in Brunetti, the Federal Court of Appeals
found no compelling government interest for regulating scandalous
speech.'00 Although the Brunetti court contemplated the government's
asserted interest "in the orderly flow of commerce", the court held that the
government failed to establish how this interest existed in the regulation of
scandalous speech.' 0 '
While tarnishing marks technically affect the flow of commerce, the target
of dilution by tarnishment is the negative, unwholesome nature of the lesser
known mark.0 2 Because negative, unwholesome speech and disparaging or
scandalous speech each represent speech the government does not agree
with, the governmental interest behind dilution by tarnishment parallels the
government's attempt to establish a compelling interest in regulating
disparaging or scandalous speech.'0 3 Like disparaging and scandalous
speech, tarnishing speech communicates a psychologically negative or
1988) (mandating analysis of the government's purpose for adopting the regulation).
97. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the authority to regulate
commerce).
98. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764-65 (distinguishing the regulation of offensive speech
from the regulation of discriminatory conduct).
99. See id. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (announcing that the government's
purpose did not fall within the narrow exception to viewpoint discrimination because
trademarks are not government speech).
100. See In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that the
government does not have a substantial interest in protecting the public from "offputting" marks), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 782 (2019).
101. See id. (observing that regulating the orderly flow of commerce might have
constituted a substantial interest had the regulation actually advanced the orderly flow of
commerce).
102. See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2010)
(contending that Congress designed the TDRA "to protect trademarks from any
unfavorable sexual associations").
103. Compare 152 CONG. REC. H6964 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2006) (stating that the
TDRA "clearly codifies the cause of action of dilution by tarnishment in order to prevent
harm to a trademark owner's reputation, resulting, for example, from a disparagingusage
of a same or similar mark by others") (emphasis added), with Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1355
(concluding that the government's proposed interests in regulating disparaging or
scandalous speech "boil down to permitting the government to burden speech it finds
offensive").
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government has no compelling interest in regulating disparaging or
scandalous speech, the government has no compelling interest in regulating
tarnishing speech. 05
Without a compelling governmental interest, dilution by tarnishment
cannot survive strict scrutiny. 0 6 Therefore, dilution
by tarnishment violates
10 7
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
3. Dilution by TarnishmentFails Strict Scrutiny Because It Is Not
Narrowly Tailoredto Achieve a Compelling Government Interest.
For a regulation to survive strict scrutiny, Congress must narrowly tailor
the regulation to achieve a compelling governmental interest.0 8 Under strict
scrutiny, a narrowly tailored regulation uses the least restrictive means to
achieve the compelling governmental interest. 10 9 Dilution by tarnishment,
as articulated in the TDRA, does not use the least restrictive means possible
because dilution by tarnishment could apply only to lesser known marks that
actually tarnish by causing harm to the famous mark. 10
In 2003, the Supreme Court in Moseley held that dilution required
establishing actual harm."' Although courts did not uniformly recognize the

104. Compare Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1757 (concluding that the disparagement clause
applies to marks that disparage the members of a racial or ethnic group), with V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 605 F.3d at 388 (insisting that an association with "lewd or bawdy
sexual activity disparages and defiles the famous mark... ").
105. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764-65 (asserting that the Disparagement Clause did not
advance even a substantial interest under intermediate scrutiny); Brunetti, 877 F.3d at
1351 (declaring that "the government does not have substantial interest in promoting
certain trademarks over others").
106. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1766 (denouncing the government's ability to mandate
positivity).
107. See Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n. v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 366 (8th Cir. 1988)
(requiring the government be able to articulate a compelling governmental interest for
enacting a regulation in question).
108. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 652 (1994) (explaining that the
Court will not strike down a constitutional statute based on an alleged illicit legislative
motive).
109. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(asserting that the regulation also needs to be the least restrictive means to achieving the
stated interest).
110. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764-65 (finding the Disparagement Clause was not the
least restrictive possible method of regulation).
111. See Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003) (positing that
circumstantial evidence may have the capacity to reliably prove actual harm).
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existence of dilution by tarnishment claims, the Supreme Court's holding
extended the actual harm requirement to dilution by tarnishment as well as
to dilution by blurring." 2 In response, Congress changed the statute to
nullify the Supreme Court's holding in Moseley and codify a likelihood of
harm standard." 3
Because dilution by tarnishment requires only a likelihood of reputational
harm, courts often rely solely on the negative viewpoint to calculate whether
a likelihood of reputational harm exists. 1 14 Relying on the lesser known
mark's alleged negative viewpoint not only allows for more dilution by
tarnishment claims by decreasing the evidentiary burden on the famous
mark, but also condones a margin of error where the court suppresses lesser
known marks that ultimately would not tarnish the famous mark's
reputation. 115 Furthermore, the TDRA's legislative history presents no
evidence refuting the viability of the actual harm standard to effectuate the
desired governmental interest. 16
Returning to the actual harm standard would narrow the reach of dilution
by tarnishment by decreasing the ability for a famous mark to rely solely on
the regulation's discrimination against negative viewpoints to succeed and
reducing the permissible margin of error."' Therefore, the TDRA's version
of dilution by tarnishment is not the least restrictive regulation possible and
in turn, violates the First Amendment's Free Speech protections." 8

112. See id. (emphasizing the need for proof of actual harm despite the potential
difficulties in obtaining it).
113. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 43, 120
Stat. 1730, 1731 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (increasing the
ease at which the owner of a famous mark may succeed on a dilution by tarnishment
claim and thereby suppress a similar, lesser known mark).
114. See, e.g., V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d at 389 (6th Cir. 2010)
(finding a likelihood of dilution by tarnishment without evidence of actual dilution by
tarnishment).
115. See id. at 394 (Moore, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for requiring only
a "mere possibility" of tarnishment because the lesser known mark's tarnishing effect
was nothing more than speculative).
116. See Farley, supra note 28, at 1181-83 (positing that Congress enacted the TDRA
because of the aggressive lobbying efforts by owners of famous marks to protect the
goodwill of those famous marks).
117. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98 § 3(a), 109
Stat. 985, 985, superseded by the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (requiring
evidence of actual dilution for an actionable claim).
118. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1767 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(denouncing governmental attempts to burden speech based on the government's
disapproval with the speech's perspective).
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Dilution by TarnishmentAlso FailsStrict Scrutiny Because It
Impermissibly Regulates the Expressive Content of a Mark.

Even if dilution by tamishment does not discriminate based on viewpoint,
dilution by tarnishment still fails strict scrutiny because it impermissibly
regulates the expressive content of speech." 9 By failing strict scrutiny,
dilution by tarnishment violates the Free Speech Clause of the First

Amendment. 120
1. Dilution by TarnishmentRegulates the Expressive Content of Speech
Because It Does Not Target the Commercial,Source Identifying Function
of a Mark.
A regulation targets the expressive content of speech when the content
does more than propose a commercial transaction. 12 1 Content-based
regulation of expressive speech is presumptively unconstitutional, so the
22
regulation must survive strict scrutiny to remain in effect. 1
Commercial speech content only proposes an immediate or eventual
commercial transaction. 123 When it created the commercial speech test in
Central Hudson, the Supreme Court invalidated a regulation banning all
public utility advertising promoting the use of electricity because it
impermissibly restricted commercial speech. 124 The promotional advertising
invited consumers to consider purchasing the utility. 125 Although the
advertisement did not propose an immediate commercial transaction, the
only purpose of the advertisement's regulated content was to eventually lead
119. See In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1333, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that the parties
did not dispute that the Scandalousness Clause fails strict scrutiny if the regulation
targeted expressive content of trademarks), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 782 (2019).
120. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (noting
that the right of expression generally prevails over content-based speech restrictions
shielding the sensibility of the audience).
121. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976) (carving out commercial speech, which merely proposes a commercial
transaction).
122. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 (asserting that the content-based regulation also
needs to be the least restrictive means to achieving the compelling governmental
interest).
123. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 762 (defining commercial speech for
the first time).
124. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 56667 (1980) (finding that promotional advertising is commercial speech).
125. See id. at 567 (maintaining that this invitation exists even for monopolies because
the customer may increase, decrease, or eliminate their purchasing based on the
promotional advertising).
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consumers to engage in a commercial transaction.'2 6 Accordingly, any
content of speech that does more than immediately or eventually propose a
commercial transaction is fully protected expressive content.' 2
Because speech can possess both commercial and expressive content,
courts examine the function of contested speech within the context of each
case. 128 Thus, courts routinely grant limited constitutional protection to
speech that functions only to propose a commercial transaction, despite the
129
speech's potential expressive capacity outside the scope of the case.
Conversely, courts grant full constitutional protection when the speech does
not propose a commercial transaction, despite its existence in commerce. 3 0
When speech's commercial content and expressive content function
simultaneously, the First Amendment protects the expressive content over
the commercial content.131 For example, the Ninth Circuit in Hoffman held
that the First Amendment protected a magazine article containing altered
images of celebrities. 132 Although the altered images served the commercial
purpose of drawing in consumer attention and selling more copies of the
magazine, the Court decided the expressive contents-humor and editorial
33
representation-warranted full constitutional protection. 1
The expressive content's priority over the commercial content is important
13 4
because trademarks can possess both commercial and expressive content.

126. See id. at 561-62 (initiating commercial speech constitutional analysis of the
government's regulation because the regulation applied only to promotional advertising).
127. See id. at 566 (defining expressive speech relative to commercial speech).
128. See id. at 561-63 (distinguishing the requisite judicial analysis for regulation of
advertisements functioning to promote a commercial product from that of advertisements
functioning to inform consumers about a topic).
129. Compare id. at 563 (avoiding commercial speech constitutional analysis of
informational advertisements that did not seek to increase total sales), with Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (finding that
a television commercial informing the public about prescription drug pricings constituted
commercial speech because the pharmacist intended for the television commercial to
increase sales).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811-813
(2000) (determining that legislation of certain cable "channels primarily dedicated to
,sexually explicit adult programming' constituted a content-based expressive speech
restriction).
131. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, 255 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that expressive speech gets full First Amendment protection).
132. See id. at 1183 (addressing the right to publicity suit).
133. See id. at 1185-86 (recognizing the article included protected forms of
expression).
134. See In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (arguing that

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2019

19

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 6
484

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 27:3

In Tam, the Supreme Court recognized this dichotomy, yet declined to
135
supply any responsive analytical framework at that moment.
A mark's commercial content reigns when the mark's only function is to
identify the source of the mark's underlying goods and services. 136 By
identifying the source of certain goods or services, the mark invites its
viewers to consider engaging in a commercial transaction with that source. 137
Accordingly, trademark law protects the validity of the mark's source
identifying function. 138 For example, a typical trademark infringement
lawsuit questions whether the defendant's use of its mark in the marketplace
is likely to confuse or mislead relevant consumers as to the source of its
underlying goods or services. 139 The expressive content of the mark helps
inform the court's analysis because each marks' expressive meaning affects
0
consumers' understanding of and ability to distinguish between the marks.14
However, constitutionality under the First Amendment Free Speech Clause
is not an issue in typical trademark infringement cases because the
expressive content is useful only to the extent it helps determine consumers'
ability to recognize the mark as a distinct source indicator. 14 1 Moreover,
trademark law's power to suppress marks in such situations extends only to
trademarks' commercial and expressive contents are often intertwined), cert. granted,
139 S. Ct. 782 (2019).
135. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763-65 (2017) (refusing to decide whether
strict or intermediate scrutiny was appropriate).
136. See McCarthy, supra note 46, at § 31:139 (arguing the mark is commercial when
identifying and distinguishing the source of commercial goods or services by providing
information on with whom to enter a commercial transaction).
137. See Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 906 (acknowledging that using "Barbie" in the song
title would attract attention, proposing further commercial transactions).
138. See, e.g., Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) (explaining that
trademark law does not protect merely descriptive trademarks because "they do not
inherently identify a specific source" when describing a product).
139. See generally Virgin Enterprises Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2003)
(applying the six likelihood of confusion factors Judge Friendly established in the
seminal case Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961)).
140. See Physicians Formula Cosmetics v. West Cabot Cosmetics, 857 F.2d 80, 84
(2d Cir. 1977) (analyzing the similarity of meaning between the mark "PHYSICIANS
FORMULA" and the mark "PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS" while applying the
Polaroidlikelihood of confusion test); see also Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 796 (explaining
that trademark law does protect descriptive marks that have acquired distinctiveness as
secondary meaning in the minds of consumers).
141. See PhysiciansFormula Cosmetics, 857 F.2d at 84 (limiting legal protection of
the plaintiff's mark "to preventing competing products from using a mark that conveys
the concept of medical endorsement in language likely to confuse a purchaser as to the
source of the product") (emphasis added).
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the source identifying function of the marks' commercial content. 141
Because the mark's commercial content reigns only when the mark's sole
function is to identify the source of its underlying goods or services, the
143
mark's expressive content necessarily reigns in all other circumstances.
For example, the Ninth Circuit recognized the song "Barbie Girl" used the
144
mark "Barbie" in the title for both commercial and expressive functions.
Like the court in Hoffman, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case, despite the
mark's promotional advertising function, because the First Amendment
45
prioritizes a mark's expressive function over the commercial function.
The Ninth Circuit listed some clear examples of a mark's potential
expressive function, such as political advocacy, but this list was not
exhaustive. 46
Thus, the First Amendment entitles a mark to full
constitutional protection unless the mark has no meaning,
under the
4
circumstances, beyond its source identifying function.' 1
Congress did not create dilution by tarnishment to regulate a mark's

commercial, source identifying content. 148
In typical trademark
infringement, Congress cares about preventing consumers' confusion as to
the source of a trademark. 149 Even in dilution by blurring, Congress cares
142. See Virgin Enterprises Ltd., 335 F.3d at 152 (granting a preliminary injunction
to prohibit the defendant from continuing to use its infringing mark in commerce because
of the likelihood of consumer confusion from such use).
143. See, e.g., Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, § 43(c), 120 Stat. 1730,
1731 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (excluding from dilution
liability any fair use, all news reporting and commentary, and any noncommercial use).
Cf Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2002) (identifying
the conflict between the TDRA's use in commerce requirement and the TDRA's
noncommercial use exception to liability and then adopting First Amendment case law's
commercial speech versus expressive speech paradigm).
144. See Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 906 (comparing the mark's commercial, attentiondrawing purpose with its the humorous, editorial purpose).
145. See id. at 907 (exempting the mark from any dilution claim).
146. See id. at 904-05 (grappling with the tension between the First Amendment and
the absence of an objective to prevent consumer confusion in the purpose behind dilution
law).
147. See id. at 900-01 (announcing that a mark owner's right to silence other marks
ceases "whenever the public imbues [the first] mark with a meaning beyond its sourceidentifying function").
148. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, § 43, 120 Stat. 1730, 1731
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (creating dilution by blurring to
prohibit dilution related to the degradation of a famous mark's source identifying
capacity).
149. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (targeting the affiliation,
connection, or association of a mark or the origin, sponsorship, or approval of a mark's
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about preventing the weakening of a famous mark's source identifying
capabilities. 50 In both situations, Congress regulates a mark's commercial
content because the regulation attaches to the trademark's central function
as a source identifier.151

Conversely, in dilution by tarnishment, Congress cares about preventing
the unwholesome, negative nature of a lesser known mark from harming the
reputation of a famous mark. 152 Because Congress's concern does not attach
to the lesser known mark's commercial, source identifying function, dilution
by tarnishment inherently targets an expressive function of the lesser known
mark. 153 Congress did not mention a mark's capacity to identify a source as
a relevant consideration for dilution by tarnishment in either the face of the
TDRA or the TDRA's legislative history. 154 Thus, trademark law's
protection of the source identifying function of a mark does not attach to
dilution by tarnishment. 155
Instead, dilution by tarnishment regulates the expressive content of speech
because it targets the lesser known mark's perceived negative mental
association. 156 For example, the Ninth Circuit in V. Secret Catalogue,Inc.
held that "Victor's Secret" constituted dilution by tarnishment because the
mark evoked negative association in the mind of consumers. 15 7 Specifically,
underlying goods or services).
150. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 43, 120
Stat. 1730, 1731 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (targeting
associations that impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark).
151. See Mattel Inc., 296 F.3d at 905 (conceding that dilution by blurring's source
designating function protects only trademark owners while typical trademark
infringement also protects consumers).
152. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 43, 120
Stat. 1730, 1730-31 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (targeting
the likelihood of reputational harm).
153. See Mattel Inc., 296 F.3d at 905 (defining "expression" with an open-ended list
of examples, focusing uniformly on the expression's divergence from the mark's
commercial, source identifying function).
154. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H6964 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Sensenbrenner) (advancing only that dilution by blurring regulates conduct relating to
the distinctiveness of the famous mark).
155. See V. Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2010)
(acknowledging that dilution by tamishment protects the famous mark's reputation and
symbolism).
156. See In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (suggesting, but not
holding, that the regulation of offensive speech inherently targets expressive content),
cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 782 (2019).
157. See V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 605 F.3d at 389 (requiring only a likelihood of
tamishment).
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"Victor's Secret" elicited an association with sex because the underlying
store sold sex-related products.' 58 Because the court interpreted Congress's
intent for enacting the TDRA as the protection of famous trademarks from
"any unfavorable sexual associations", the court used dilution by
tarnishment to suppress the lesser known mark based on the lesser known
mark's sex-related expressive content. 5 9 Thus, dilution by tarnishment
targets the expressive rather than the commercial content
of marks, violating
60
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 1
2. Dilution by TarnishmentFailsStrict Scrutinyfor Content-Based
Expressive Speech Regulations Because It Does Not Serve a Compelling
GovernmentalInterest.

Much like viewpoint discrimination, regulation of a mark's expressive
content must further a compelling governmental interest to survive strict
scrutiny. 16 ' The alleged governmental interest for dilution by tarnishment
remains the same for content-based regulations as for viewpoint
discrimination: the constitutionality tests differ
primarily in the
162
circumstances necessary to trigger strict scrutiny.
The Supreme Court's holding in Tam and the Federal Court of Appeal's
extension of Tam in Brunetti control the disposition of dilution by
tarnishment. 163 The Brunetti court contemplated the government's asserted
interest "in the orderly flow of commerce", yet the court did not find even a
substantial governmental interest because the government failed to articulate
164
how this interest existed in the suppression of scandalous speech.
158. See id. at 387-88 (charting the consensus in the case law that an association with
sex-related products is negative).
159. See id. (commenting that any mark with "lewd or offensive-to-some sexual
associations" would likely constitute tarnishment).
160. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764-65 (2017) (asserting that offensive
speech is protected speech).
161. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(asserting that the regulation also needs to be the least restrictive means to achieving the
stated interest).
162. See In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (implying the
Scandalousness Clause would also fail strict scrutiny if the Scandalousness Clause
regulated the expressive content of the mark), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 782 (2019).
163. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding neither a
compelling interest behind the government's censorship nor an exception to exempt the
government from the application of strict scrutiny analysis); see also Brunetti, 877 F.3d
1330 (holding that the government does not have a substantial interest in promoting
certain trademarks over others or in protecting the public from "off-putting" marks).
164. See Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1349 (noting that regulating the orderly flow of

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2019

23

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 6
488

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 27:3

Furthermore, a purported Congressional interest in regulating the orderly
flow of commerce is not compelling because dilution by tarnishment merely
regulates the expressive content of certain allegedly negative marks, rather
65
than the mark's commercial, source identifying content. 1
Although allegedly tarnishing lesser known marks exist in and affect the
flow of commerce, the government does not have a compelling interest
backing dilution by tarnishment because dilution by tarnishment targets a
lesser known mark's expressive content, rather than the lesser known mark's
commercial, source identifying content. 166
The Disparagement and
Scandalousness Clauses similarly violated the First Amendment because the
government failed to articulate a single compelling governmental interest.167
Just as the government has no compelling interest in regulating disparaging
or scandalous speech, the government similarly has no compelling interest
in regulating tarnishing speech.168 Therefore, dilution by tarnishment does
not serve a compelling governmental interest. 169
The government cannot regulate a mark based on the mark's expressive
17
content, even if that content is disparaging or offensive to many people. 0
Due to the government's lack of a compelling interest in regulating the
expressive content of a mark, dilution17 by tarnishment violates the First
Amendment's Free Speech protections.'
commerce would have constituted a substantial interest, had it existed).
165. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the authority to regulate
commerce); see also Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764-65 (distinguishing regulating offensive
speech from regulating discriminatory conduct).
166. See V. Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 603 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2010)
(contending Congress designed the TDRA "to protect trademarks from any unfavorable
sexual associations").
167. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764-65 (asserting that the Disparagement Clause did not
advance even a substantial interest under intermediate scrutiny); Brunetti, 877 F.3d at
1350 (declaring that "the government does not have substantial interest in promoting
certain trademarks over others"); see also 152 CONG. REC. H6964 (daily ed. Sept. 25,
2006) (using "tarnishing" and "disparaging" interchangeably when explaining dilution
by tarnishment).
168. Compare Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1757 (concluding that the disparagement clause
applies to marks that disparage the members of a racial or ethnic group), with V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 603 F.3d at 388 (insisting that an association with "lewd or bawdy
sexual activity disparages and defiles the famous mark... ").
169. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (denouncing the
government's ability to mandate positivity).
170. See id. at 1767 (suggesting the suppression of offensive ideas is especially
dangerous because the audience's reaction to the offense may spurn more thoughtful and
tolerant positions).
171. See id. (noting the long history of cases prohibiting the government from
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3. Dilution by TarnishmentDoes Not Survive Strict Scrutiny Because It Is
Not Narrowly Tailored to Achieve a Compelling Government Interest.
Congress must utilize the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling

governmental interest for that regulation to survive strict scrutiny. 17 2 Under
the TDRA, dilution by tarnishment is not the least restrictive means possible

because Congress
could amend the TDRA to require proof of actual
3
dilution. 17
Before the TDRA, dilution required the plaintiff to establish actual
reputational harm because a likelihood of harm was too speculative, thereby

stifling fair competition. 174 The Supreme Court in Moseley clarified this
requirement and extended it to dilution by tarnishment claims. 17 In
response, Congress changed the statute for dilution by tarnishment to require
only a likelihood of reputational harm. 176
Because the actual harm standard presented Congress with a plausible,

less restrictive method for serving Congress's alleged interest, dilution by
tarnishment fails strict scrutiny analysis. 177 In Playboy Entm 't Grp. Inc., the
Supreme Court held that the government bears the burden of proving a less
restrictive alternative regulation is ineffective when the regulation targets the
expressive content of speech. 178 However, Congress did not articulate a
suppressing speech based on predicted audience reactions).
172. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 624 (1994) (announcing strict
scrutiny applies to governmental suppression or burdening of speech because of the
speech's content); United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(asserting that the government must use the least restrictive method to advance its
proposed interest).
173. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764-65 (finding the Disparagement Clause was not the
least restrictive possible method of regulation).
174. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432-33 (2003)
(interpreting the FTDA and reviewing dilution case law).
175. See id. at 434 (emphasizing the need for proof of actual harm despite the potential
difficulties in obtaining proof of actual harm).
176. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 43, 120 Stat. 1730,
1730 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (changing the standard
after the Supreme Court held the FTDA required actual harm); see also V Secret
Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2010) (accepting Congress's
intent to enact the TDRA despite the Supreme Court's legitimate concerns about the risk
of utilizing the easily surmountable likelihood of tarnishment standard).
177. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98 § 3(a), 109
Stat. 985, 985 (amended by the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006) (allowing
injunctions for dilution by tarnishment only when the famous mark owner establishes the
lesser known mark actually tarnished the famous mark's reputation).
178. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp. Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 823 (2000)
(indicating that the government, not the District Court, bears the responsibility to prove
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reason why the actual harm standard might be ineffective. 179 Furthermore,

the actual harm standard is less restrictive than the likelihood of harm
standard because the actual harm standard eliminates the ability to presume
harm based only on the expressive content of the lesser known mark. 80
Without a compelling reason behind Congress's switch to the likelihood
of harm standard, dilution by tarnishment fails strict scrutiny and violates the
First Amendment's protection of expressive speech. 8 '
C. Alternatively, Dilution by TarnishmentFails IntermediateScrutinyfor
CommercialSpeech Regulations Because Congress DidNot Narrowly
Tailor It to Advance a Substantial GovernmentalInterest.
While dilution by tarnishment likely regulates a mark's viewpoint or a
mark's expressive content, dilution by tarnishment nonetheless fails
intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech regulations. 8 2 Dilution by
tarnishment does not advance even a substantial governmental interest and
is not narrow enough to survive the CentralHudson intermediate scrutiny
test. "83
'
Therefore, dilution by tarnishment still violates the Free Speech
84
Clause of the First Amendment.
First, a commercial speech regulation survives intermediate scrutiny only
when the regulation advances a substantial governmental interest.185 The
government does not have a substantial interest in protecting the public from

an alternative would be ineffective).
179. See Farley, supra note 28, at 1181-83 (suggesting that trademark owners lobbied
fiercely for dilution law to protect their marks' goodwill).
180. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003) (maintaining
that the difficulties inherent to demonstrating actual dilution do not cause the actual
dilution standard to be ineffective).
181. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 826-27 (refuting any perception that "shabby, offensive,
or even ugly" speech does not deserve full constitutional protection, even when the
desired legislation addressed a serious problem).
182. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 760 (1976) (confirming that commercial speech deserves constitutional protection
because it retains value in the marketplace of ideas).
183. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (creating the intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech regulations
permissible under the First Amendment).
184. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764-65 (2017) (holding invalid the
Disparagement Clause under the CentralHudson intermediate scrutiny test).
185. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 568-69 (stating that the
regulation of energy consumption is a substantial interest because the country depends
on energy resources, and the regulation of utility rates was a substantial interest because
it involves issues of economic supply and distributional fairness).
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disparaging or offensive speech because doing so impermissibly suppresses
the freedom to express ideas. 8 6 If dilution by tarnishment targets the
commercial content of speech, then the government has a stronger argument
for an interest in promoting the orderly flow of commerce because the marks
are acting within their source identifying functions.' 8 7 However, the
government still does not have a substantial interest in regulating tarnishing
marks because dilution by tarnishment puts the government in a position of
protecting famous marks over perceived negative marks, and "the
government does not have a substantial interest in promoting certain
trademarks over others."' 88
Second, the government must narrowly tailor a regulation of commercial
speech for that regulation to survive intermediate scrutiny; unlike strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny does not require the least restrictive means to
achieve the stated substantial interest. 8 9 In CentralHudson, the Supreme
Court determined the government's ban on promotional advertising was too
expansive because the regulation affected all promotional advertising, even
if the advertisement did not violate the government's substantial interest in
conserving energy. 90 Similarly, dilution by tarnishment allows the famous
mark to suppress all lesser known marks that may create a negative
association with the famous mark because the negative association
unilaterally indicates a likelihood of reputational harm. '91
186. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (rejecting a governmental interest in "preventing
speech expressing ideas that offend" and abstaining from determining whether the
government has a substantial interest in "driving out trademarks that support invidious
discrimination"); see also Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1350 (emphasizing that precedent and
the purpose of the First Amendment prevent the government from having a substantial
interest in protecting the public from negative marks).
187. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566-67 (finding that the
government had a substantial interest in regulating a utility company's promotional
advertising because the advertising only proposed a commercial transaction, and the
utility industry has a substantial commercial impact).
188. See Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1350 (explaining that the government does not have an
interest in choosing certain trademarks over others because trademarks are not
government speech).
189. See Tam, 137 S. Ct at 1764-65 (asserting Congress did not sufficiently tailor the
Disparagement Clause to drive out trademarks that support invidious discrimination
because the Clause also prohibited disparagement of discriminating groups of people like
racists).
190. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 570 (highlighting that the
government failed to show why "a more limited restriction on the content of promotional
advertising would not serve adequately the State's interests").
191. See V. Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 603 F.3d 382, 392 (6th Cir. 2010)
(Moore, J.,
dissenting) (exposing that, on the same facts, the Supreme Court previously
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Furthermore, although the actual harm standard increases the famous
mark's evidentiary burden, the Supreme Court in Moseley defended the
actual harm standard because the government had presented no credible
reason why the heightened burden would fail to adequately serve the
government's interests. 19 2 Thus, Congress did not narrowly tailor dilution
by tarnishment in the TDRA. 193
Because dilution by tarnishment does not serve a substantial interest or
because Congress did not narrowly tailor dilution by tarnishment, dilution
by tarnishment fails the commercial speech intermediate94scrutiny test and
violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 1
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
Because it violates the First Amendment's speech protections, dilution by

tarnishment is vulnerable to judicial invalidation.
Congress should
preemptively repeal dilution by tarnishment to avoid judicial embarrassment.
Furthermore, a preemptive repeal would grant Congress the discretion to

decide how to proceed, free from judicial mandates or limitations.
Congress will likely have tremendous difficulty articulating a
constitutional version of dilution by tarnishment within trademark law

because dilution by tarnishment primary focus is a mark's viewpoint and/or
expressive content instead of the mark's source identifying capacity.
However, if Congress commits to maintaining legislation in the spirit of
dilution by tarnishment, then Congress should initiate much more discussion

and research into discovering a constitutionally viable purpose for dilution
by tarnishment.
CONCLUSION

Dilution by tarnishment discriminates based on the viewpoint of the lesser

known mark toward the famous trademark, regardless of whether the lesser

and explicitly found no evidence that "Victor's Secret" even affected the singular
witness's positive impression of "Victoria's Secret").
192. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003) (dismissing
respondents' notion that the difficulty of obtaining direct evidence of dilution demands
instituting a less burdensome standard).
193. See Brunetti, 877, F.3d at 1354-55 (leaving the "difficult task to determine public
perceptions of a trademark's morality or immorality, offensiveness, or even vulgarity"
to the individual, and thus largely out of the government's purview).
194. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (lambasting the argument that
the commercial speech label permits the suppression of "any expression likely to cause
offense" or "that may lead to political or social 'volatility').
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known mark functions as expressive or commercial speech. 195 Because
dilution by tarnishment does not advance a compelling governmental interest
or is not narrow enough to survive strict scrutiny, dilution
by tarnishment
96
violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 1
If dilution by tarnishment does not discriminate based on viewpoint, then
it impermissibly regulates the expressive content of speech because it targets
a perceived negative mental association rather than a mark's source
identifying function. 197
By still failing strict scrutiny, dilution by
tarnishment violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 98
Even if dilution by tarnishment regulates the commercial content of
speech, it fails the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test because
Congress did not narrowly tailor it to advance a substantial governmental
interest.'99 Therefore, Congress should repeal dilution by tarnishment.

195. See id. at 1763 (asserting that offensive speech is protected speech); Brunetti,
877 F.3d at 1351 (declaring that "the government does not have substantial interest in
promoting certain trademarks over others").
196. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (applying the strict
scrutiny constitutional standard for content-based regulations of expressive speech).
197. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that expressive speech gets full First Amendment protection because the speech
does more than merely promote commercial transactions).
198. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000)
(rejecting the notion that the government has compelling interest in regulating negative,
sexually graphic speech to protect public sensibility).
199. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (applying the constitutional standard of intermediate scrutiny to regulations of
commercial speech).
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